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PRM-10

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19 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NI  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: PRM-10 Force Posture Study from DoD

General Concept: I sensed inadequate attention in the draft paper to the following areas:

- a. Possibility of conflict in the Middle East.
- b. Peacetime competition for the perception of men's minds.
- c. The peacetime competition in the areas of the world other than East Asia and Europe - what may well be the areas of greatest competition in the years ahead since there is a general stalemate in East Asia and Western Europe. Whether or not military force is applicable to the possibility of expanding competition in the non-East Asia/Europe areas seems to deserve consideration.
- d. The impact of the nuclear balance on world perceptions.
- e. Conflict or competition in East Asia without corresponding competition/conflict in Western Europe. In other words,  
If so, I would believe we need to keep a military capability in the area.
- f. Alternatives to military force to achieve some of our objectives - e.g., Persian Gulf Oil - don't we have alternatives of greater stockpiling and long-term attrition against the Soviet submarine/bomber forces which might attack that shipping rather than direct protection of it, e.g., dealing with major force asymmetries is not only a question of what strategic

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forces we have, but what type they are, how we talk about them, etc., whereas substrategy (4) in Annex E only addresses this in terms of U.S. superiority.

- g. Our role in PRM-10, based on this paper: it seems to me we begin by separating the strategic issues from the conventional.
- (1) Strategic - don't we need to come up with a menu of what we anticipate Soviet strategic capabilities will be in the next decade with and without success itself, e.g., what will the Soviet hard-target complex look like and against which our strategic force posture must be gauged?
  - (2) Conventional.
    - (a) Europe - don't we need a position on what Warsaw Pact capabilities are likely to be, against which the gradations in NATO capability can be gauged?
    - (b) East Asia - don't we need to estimate what the potential threat to the Philippines, Korea, Okinawa and Japan are, based on a purely military assumption, and perhaps even the potential of the Soviets to attack the Chinese, or vice versa?
    - (c) Peacekeeping in local wars: Don't we need to make an estimate of what the Soviet capabilities are for extending their influence to the peacetime use of forces and/or for military intervention, in areas noncontiguous to the Soviet Union?

  
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